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December 16, 1981

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NSC Review Completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
✓ THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting

The President will chair a National Security Council Meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House on Friday, December 18, 1981, from 1:45 p.m. - 2:15 p.m. There will be one agenda item:

Military Manpower

The paper for the agenda item is attached.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


James W. Nance

Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Review on December 16, 1983

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A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRATION

Submitted by
THE MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE
December 15, 1981

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The Task Force submits this analysis of Selective Service registration to assist you in your decision on whether to continue or discontinue peacetime registration.

Options

The options are:

- OPTION A. No change: continue peacetime registration.
- Stop registration and replace it with either:
 - OPTION B. Post-mobilization registration: prepare to implement post-mobilization registration on a schedule which improves on the 1980 registration experience,
 - OPTION C. Accelerated post-mobilization registration: prepare to implement accelerated post-mobilization registration through prepositioning of materials, and other measures, or
 - OPTION D. Pre-mobilization registration: prepare to resume registration quickly in an emergency, prior to mobilization.

Background

The Gates Commission Report, which convinced President Nixon to establish an All Volunteer Force, recommended that Selective Service registration be continued. However, registration was discontinued in 1975. In 1976, the Defense Manpower Commission recommended resumption of peacetime registration. Exercise NIFTY NUGGET in 1978, and analyses in 1979 by the General Accounting Office, Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that Selective Service could not perform as required in an emergency.

In reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter reinstated registration. Congress debated the proposal at length. During this debate, you expressed your opposition to registration in a letter to Senator Hatfield (Tab A). The international environment has changed since you sent that letter -- Theater Nuclear Force negotiations, tensions in Central America, Gulf of Sidra, Sadat's death, and Poland. Also, you based your opposition, in part, on an estimate, now repudiated by the former Director of Selective Service, "that registration will save a scant seven days...". Registration resumed in July 1980.

Young men now register by completing a simple form at any U.S. Post Office. Selective Service compiles and maintains this information so that in an emergency it could quickly begin to induct men in the proper order.

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Registration has generally proceeded as planned. Over 90% of the eligible population of the first three year-of-birth groups has registered. Most of these young men registered in three one-week periods. Those registering now do so on a continuous basis within a month of their 18th birthday. Only about 77% of those expected to register since January 1981 have done so. We think this decline is due to their lack of awareness of the obligation to register, to uncertainty over the Administration position, and to traditional tardiness. Historically, about 20% have registered late; however, most register before the year they turn twenty and would be eligible for a wartime draft, in which 20-year olds would be called first.

In November 1980, DOD accelerated its wartime delivery schedule for inductees. Later that month, during Exercise PROUD SPIRIT, the Joint Staff confirmed that with peacetime registration Selective Service was able to meet the new, more demanding delivery schedule. Since then, the 50 Governors and their counterparts in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia have supported a program to name volunteer local board members who would be needed during an emergency. Over 26,000 citizens applied for the 10,500 unpaid positions.

Factors to Consider

Our analysis examined the following factors: time saved, impact on DOD, equity, risk, acceptance, cost, and implementation.

Time Saved

The following table compares the different registration options in terms of the time in which each would be able to deliver inductees to the Department of Defense.

Time to Deliver First Inductees - Comparison by Option

	<u>Weeks to Deliver First Inductees</u>	<u>Weeks Lost if Registration is Stopped</u>
<u>Option A:</u> Continue Registration	2	-
<u>Option B:</u> Post M-Day Registration	8	6
<u>Option C:</u> Accelerated Post M-Day Registration	4	2
<u>Option D:</u> Pre-M-Day Registration	2-8	0-6

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With peacetime registration in operation (Option A), inductees would start to arrive at training bases thirteen days after the start of mobilization. Under this option a lottery would be conducted as soon as mobilization is begun. Those selected for induction would be ordered, via a Western Union mailgram, to report 10 days later to a specified location for examination and induction. This plan assumes that Congress will authorize induction in three days. Congress will likely act in that short a time only in what it believes to be an extreme emergency. Any delay by the Congress will delay the arrival of inductees beyond the thirteen days specified in this plan.

If registration is stopped now and resumed after mobilization, the first inductees would arrive about 4 to 8 weeks after a decision is made to mobilize.

The eight week estimate (Option B) was developed by Selective Service and improves upon the registration conducted in 1980. That process took about 16 weeks after all preparations were in place, but it was in a non-emergency environment. Under Option B materials would be pre-addressed and packed for rapid distribution from Great Lakes, Illinois. Registration would be conducted by pre-trained US Postal Service personnel over a two day period. Completed forms would be processed at ten Internal Revenue Service sites and transmitted to the joint computer center. Lottery numbers would be assigned, inductees identified, and on M+48 days the first mailgram orders would be issued. Inductees would begin to arrive on M+58 or about six weeks later than with peacetime registration.

The accelerated post-mobilization schedule (Option C) could deliver inductees in about four weeks. Under this option materials would be stored during peacetime at about 250 specified postal centers and distributed immediately upon mobilization to 35,000 post offices, which Postmaster General Bolger has said he would be willing to do. As in Option B, registration would be conducted over a two day period. Postal employees would manually sort completed cards by birth date, and concurrently a lottery of birthdates would be conducted. Registration cards of those to be called in the first several days would be expedited to ten Internal Revenue Service sites where they would be processed first. These data would then be transmitted to the computer center at Great Lakes, Illinois, thus allowing the issuance of induction orders before all cards were processed. Late registrants would be placed in the pool as the data becomes available.

Finally, the reporting time for induction for the initial inductees under Option C would be reduced to seven days. Options A and B use a ten day reporting period. Historically, registrants have generally received at least 30 days notice. With these three actions -- pre-positioning, pre-sorting, and reduced reporting time -- Option C would deliver inductions about two weeks later than with peacetime registration.

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If registration is discontinued, there is one other way to deliver inductees rapidly -- by reinstituting registration in a perceived emergency (Option D). This option has the potential for delivering inductees as quickly as with peacetime registration and faster than they would be delivered under the post-mobilization proposals (Options B and C).

Option D assumes that warning signals will be available before a decision to induct is made. The warning time before a war begins may be less than a week or warning signals may be evident for several months during a slowly developing international crisis.

If such a warning results in a decision to resume registration as much as two months prior to a decision to induct, the delivery of inductees to DOD would be as rapid as with peacetime registration. If warning signals were not available, or were not acted upon soon enough, this option would result in a delivery slower than that provided by peacetime registration, and perhaps as slow as the post-mobilization registration options.

The feasibility of Option D is uncertain. Beginning registration of the youth of the nation during an international crisis could send a clear warning signal to nations that may be considering acting against our vital interests. However, the decision to begin registration may escalate the crisis. A further complication is that Congressional and public support for resuming registration during an international crisis may be uncertain.

Impact on DOD

Registration has no impact on the trained manpower available to DOD in the first three months following mobilization, because the law requires that men be trained for at least 12 weeks before they are deployed. With peacetime registration in place, inductees could be delivered in two weeks after mobilization and begin flowing out of the training centers by M+103 days. The post-mobilization registration options (B and C) delay the time trained draftees are available. The impact of this delay on the prosecution of war depends on the number of trained individual reservists available to the Army, the number of volunteers who would respond in an emergency, and the capacity of the Army's training base to handle new draftees.

The shortage of trained individual reservists (IRR) is a serious Army manpower problem, especially considering the current manpower shortage in Army Guard and Reserve units. This problem is not solved by peacetime registration. Indeed some believe that registration creates the impression that our mobilization manpower problems are solved, thereby diverting attention from the more important shortfall in the IRR.

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We are uncertain of the number of young men who would volunteer when the nation's survival is at stake. The Task Force looked only at the Army since it is likely that the other Services, which require smaller augmentation, would receive enough volunteers. We examined four levels of volunteers ranging from 16,000 to over 200,000 during the first two months of mobilization.

Analysis indicates that if large numbers of volunteers -- equal to or greater than the number who volunteered immediately after Pearl Harbor as adjusted for population growth -- were to come forward today, the Army's current mobilization training base would not be large enough to accept any inductees immediately. Indeed, the training base would be filled by volunteers, if we experienced a volunteer rate equal to 70% of the volunteer rate immediately following Pearl Harbor. However, if lesser numbers volunteer, inductees would be needed immediately.

However, the Army is expanding its mobilization training base through 1986. Even with large numbers of volunteers (post Pearl Harbor rate) the enlarged training base could not be filled without either peacetime registration or a registration which began at least one month before mobilization. Unused training slots can never be recovered and they reduce the flow of replacements to the battlefield.

Army planners feel that it is more prudent to assume that very few volunteers will come forward in the event of war. They prefer to have an assured flow of new trainees. They believe that peacetime registration is the only way to assure that the current or expanded training base will be filled.

The Army needs enough pretrained individual reservists to fill units and replace casualties until draftees and new volunteers can be trained. Initiatives are now being considered by the Task Force to eliminate the shortfall of these individual reservists in the first few months of mobilization. These improvements would not be fully realized until 1990 and beyond. To the extent these initiatives -- and others which may be proposed -- are successful, they would diminish the urgency of rapid delivery of inductees and perhaps obviate the need for peacetime registration. It is important to note, however, that the Army IRR shortfall cannot be cured with the proposed remedies until 1990. This is because the key remedy requires a longer period of service in the IRR, which is best done by having all newly entering enlistees agree to a combined active and reserve military service obligation longer than the current six year period. Other remedies would cure the problem sooner, such as involuntarily extending the military service obligation of those who have already volunteered. These other remedies would violate enlistment contracts by keeping people in the IRR longer than they originally volunteered to serve.

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In addition, if peacetime registration were stopped, DOD would lose recruiting leads. Since registration has begun, about one million young men indicated their interest in receiving recruiting materials about the armed services. However, even without registration, most young men will be contacted by recruiters and exposed repeatedly to recruiting advertisements and mailings.

Equity

Peacetime registration would improve the fairness of the initial calls of a wartime draft, if the lists from which people are drafted are more complete and more accurate. Peacetime registration provides additional time to improve the completeness and accuracy of registration lists, but we don't know how complete peacetime or post-mobilization lists will be at the time inductions are begun.

With peacetime registration (Option A), the 20% who register late and the 15% who make errors on their registration forms are available for a wartime draft since the time lapse between registration (age 18) and induction (age 20) permits the inclusion of late registrants and correction of errors on registration forms. The lists do, however, deteriorate over time because as much as 25% of this population group moves each year, and the Selective Service System cannot be sure of tracking all those changes. They estimate, based on results of mailings, that only about 3% of the induction letters would be undeliverable, but the system for maintaining current addresses has not yet been evaluated.

If the post-mobilization registration compliance rate was the same as the recent peacetime rate, it would produce less complete lists and make initial draft calls less equitable, because late registrants and registrants who make errors on their registration forms are necessarily excluded from initial draft calls. The Selective Service System believes that such draft calls, based on peacetime registration experience, would initially include only 60-80% of the cohort group.

On the other hand, if wartime registration compliance exceeded that of peacetime registration, the relative equity would improve and could be similar to that of peacetime registration. Hard data are not available from wartime experiences, but Selective Service historical reports suggest that 90% or more would register on time, if the nation were mobilizing for war. In any case, the equity concern is a temporary one since the lists are corrected over time.

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Risk

The Task Force also examined whether Selective Service could meet the time schedules specified in each of the alternative registration plans. Selective Service is confident that it can currently deliver inductees within two weeks, as expected. This capability has been tested by DOD in mobilization exercises. If peacetime registration is stopped and must be performed after mobilization, there would be increased risk that Selective Service could not meet the time schedules specified for Options B or C. The Director of Selective Service rates that risk as moderate for Option B, and high for Option C, believing that Option C cannot be executed in the prescribed time. Frequent testing of the process during peacetime would reduce risks and allow a more accurate determination of the most likely delivery time for inductees.

Option D, which assumes that registration would be resumed before mobilization is also risky. It is difficult to predict how much warning time would be available before mobilization is required and how a President would react during a period of international tension.

Acceptance

Congress supported peacetime registration in 1980 and provided funding to continue registration this year. Many of the strongest Congressional supporters of the Administration's defense program have written letters in favor of peacetime registration. Others have urged the President to stop registration. (See Tab B)

According to the September 1981 Harris Poll, 83% of US families support registration, including families with draft age males. These people may look upon registration as a civic responsibility. Leading veterans organizations strongly support continued registration.

However, some young men apparently believe it to be either an unimportant or an unjustifiable obligation. Others are simply not aware of the obligation. For the four year groups that have either registered or are in the processing of registering, about 800,000 (10% of 8 million) young men have not registered and are in violation of the law. More would probably register if publicity were enhanced. Many more would undoubtedly register if prosecutions were begun, but a large number may not. Even a non-compliance rate of 5%, comparable to that existing in the period 1973-1975, would result in 100,000 non-registrants per year group.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe peacetime registration is an important aspect of US deterrent strategy. They believe that termination of registration could be seen as being inconsistent with efforts to strengthen the US defense posture and could indicate a weakening of US resolve. All NATO Allies, except

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Canada and the United Kingdom, have conscription and would likely view our stopping registration as inconsistent with our policy of urging them to make greater defense efforts.

It is not clear how the Soviets would perceive the discontinuance of registration. However, since President Carter initiated registration as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets might perceive the elimination of registration as a partial acquiescence to the occupation of Afghanistan.

Costs

The cost of peacetime registration is approximately \$4 million per year or two dollars per registrant. The largest cost element is reimbursement to the US Postal Service. The FY 82 Selective Service budget is \$20M; therefore, if registration is stopped, the Selective Service budget should drop to about \$16M.

However, the Congress has directed that Selective Service spending not exceed \$12M per year if registration is stopped, which would cause Selective Service to revert back to "deep standby", making it impossible to meet even the eight week schedule for Option B. Thus, Administration support would be necessary to increase the authorization amount to \$16 million, if peacetime registration is stopped.

The costs of increasing compliance with peacetime registration are difficult to estimate. A program to enhance registration compliance involves two basic elements: publicity and enforcement, the latter sometimes complementing the former.

A vigorous publicity campaign, which relies on public service announcements and mailings, would cost about \$500,000 per year. Selective Service undertook one mailing program in August 1980, costing about \$150,000. Experience with that program, as well as other exposure in the local and national media, indicates that compliance improves quickly with publicity. It is more difficult to estimate the costs of enforcement.

A passive enforcement program, which involves receiving and forwarding unsolicited names of possible violators to the Department of Justice, costs little. A more active enforcement program would involve seeking to identify non-registrants. Its costs are sensitive to the type of identification plan chosen.

Registration without a draft was last conducted from 1973 through 1975. At that time Selective Service operated on a decentralized basis with each state or locality conducting its own enforcement program. In most locations the program was passive; in some areas an active program, such as matching state driver license lists with registrant lists, was used. During this period, Selective Service referred the names of about 300 possible non-registrants per year to the Department of Justice. About 80%

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of these cases were resolved by registration or by a determination that the individual was not required to register. Nearly 20% of the cases were pending when registration stopped. During that period only two persons were convicted for not having registered.

Selective Service estimates that a national, active enforcement program using publicly available information to identify non-registrants would cost about \$1.5M per year. If such an identification program produced the number of possible non-registrants as were identified in the 1973-1975 period, the cost to agencies other than Selective Service, the Department of Justice, for example, would be about \$200,000 per year.

However, there are some reasons why the 1973 to 1975 experience may not be useful in predicting the amount of non-compliance with peacetime registration or estimating the costs of an enforcement program.

One view is that current compliance levels may be improved substantially by a publicity campaign and a firm Administration position supporting peacetime registration. Those who hold the view that active enforcement would not be needed, argue that registrations increased in the past year each time the national media provided some publicity, and there is much less anti-military sentiment than existed in the 1973-1975 period. They note that less than 0.1% of young men now register under protest, down from 2% last year. They believe that this indicates that fear of a follow-on draft has declined since the start of registration. Thus, these people see the problem as primarily one of awareness. They believe that an adequate compliance program would consist of a publicity program (\$500K) and an enforcement program only for those whose names are furnished unsolicited to the Selective Service System.

Others believe that publicity may not bring compliance above the roughly 90% achieved in the initial peacetime registration process. In that case, some 200,000 young men per year group would be violating the law, making further action necessary. The costs of these additional enforcement activities would rise substantially above those incurred in the 1973-1975 period because:

- the enforcement activities in that period may be understated because the government then may have been comparatively reluctant to prosecute since the draft had ended, the country's wounds needed healing, and registration was perceived to be on the way out; and
- resistance to registration today may be higher because registration is now viewed by some as an escalation toward the draft, and not away from the draft as it was between 1973 and 1975.

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There are other enforcement costs that are equally difficult to quantify. They vary depending upon the level of enforcement effort necessary and include:

- Congestion in the courts. Over the period 1968 to 1973 between 6% and 11% of all federal criminal cases filed were draft law violations. However, nearly 90% of those were induction prosecutions, and prosecution activity was far less between 1973 and 1975.
- Defendants' costs. Enforcement activities will inevitably result in some expenditures by potential defendants.
- Social costs. Divisiveness may result from enforcement of rules opposed by an active minority.

Implementation

No Presidential action is required to continue peacetime registration; a statement of support by the President would serve to dispel uncertainties and thus strengthen the workings of the system.

Discontinuing peacetime registration would require a Presidential proclamation. Administration support and Congressional action would be necessary to maintain the level of funding needed to prevent Selective Service from reverting to deep standby. Some believe this Congressional action may be difficult to obtain and maintain.

A pre-mobilization registration could be ordered by the President without Congressional approval but Congress would have to approve funds for registration.

Summary

The basic arguments for and against peacetime registration are summarized below.

Those who favor continuing peacetime registration argue that:

- * It saves time in case mobilization is required -- up to six weeks.
- * It provides the basis for a more equitable wartime draft.
- * It is a low risk policy that has been tested.
- * To stop registration now would send a confused signal to our Allies and potential adversaries.
- * It will assure full utilization of Army training base capacity and thus provide trained people quickly when needed.

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- * It is widely supported by the public.
- * It is also supported by many of the strongest Congressional advocates of the Administration's defense program.

Proponents of registration also note that new tensions have arisen in Poland, the Middle East and Central America in the last year and a half, making registration more important now than it was when initiated in 1980.

Those who oppose peacetime registration argue that:

- * A draft or draft registration destroys the very values that our society is committed to defending, and is justified only in the most severe national emergency.
- * Registration creates the impression that our mobilization manpower problems are solved, diverting attention from the more important shortfall within the Army Individual Ready Reserve.
- * It may not save much, if any, time.
- * Any time saved by peacetime registration is not essential:
 - Reservists can be used during this period after the Army Reserve pool has been built up to sufficient strength.
 - The Army training base is likely to be filled by volunteers.
- * Any risk of not meeting a post-mobilization registration schedule could be reduced by practicing registration procedures in peacetime.
- * Continuation of registration will have little long-term impact on the equity of a wartime draft.
- * It is actively opposed by a vocal minority.

Opponents of registration also cite your letter of May 5, 1980, to Senator Hatfield opposing President Carter's plan to reintroduce registration (Tab A) and your reiteration of that position during your campaign.

A more detailed comparison of all four options appears on the foldout that follows.

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COMPARISON OF SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRATION OPTIONS

Continue Peacetime Registration	Discontinue Peacetime Registration And Develop Plan For:		
Option A Peacetime Registration (No Change)	Option B Post-Mobilization Registration (Improves on the 1980 Experience)	Option C Accelerated Post-Mobilization Registration (Pre-Positioned Materials, Pre-Sorted Data, Reduced Reporting Time)	Option D Pre-Mobilization Registration (Register After Emergency Occurs)

Military Requirements

Time

- | | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------------------|
| o First Inductee | o M+13 days | o M+58 days | o M+30 days | o M+13 days to M+58 days |
| o Trained Soldiers | o M+103 days | o M+148 days | o M+120 days | o M+103 days to M+148 days |

Impact on DoD

- | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| o Does not aggravate IRR shortfall and does not rely on volunteers after M-Day | o Requires larger IRR or greater reliance on volunteers | o Same as Option B | o Unless warning time can be assured, requires larger IRR or greater reliance on volunteers |
| o Insures maximum use of training base | o Unused training base capacity possible - much by 1988. However, by 1990's IRR enhancement may diminish urgency of rapid delivery of inductees | o Some unused training base capacity possible - certainly by 1988. However, by 1990's IRR enhancement may diminish urgency of rapid delivery of inductees | o If warning not adequate or not acted upon, unused training base capacity possible - much by 1988. However, by 1990's IRR enhancement may diminish urgency of rapid delivery of inductees |
| o Military deterrent unchanged | o Military deterrent may be weakened | o Same as Option B | o Same as Option B |
| o Source of recruiting leads | o Loss of recruiting leads, through leads are of undetermined value | o Same as Option B | o Same as Option B |

Risk of Not Meeting Time Schedule

- | | | | |
|-------|------------|---|--|
| o Low | o Moderate | o High. Director of Selective Service believes this delivery schedule cannot be met | o Low to high; depends on warning time and reaction
o Feasibility uncertain; requires assured warning time and decision to register |
|-------|------------|---|--|

International Reaction

- | | | | |
|---|--|--------------------|--|
| o Allies generally support registration | o May give mixed signals to Allies if U.S. stops registration while urging greater defense efforts | o Same as Option B | o Same as Option B |
| o May create perception of weakened American consensus if compliance is low or enforcement generates visible opposition | o Soviets might see as sign of a lessening of U.S. concern about Afghanistan | o Same as Option B | o Same as Option B |
| | | | o Pre-mobilization registration may be a warning signal to potential adversaries; however, it may cause the crisis to escalate |

Domestic Impact

Equity of Initial Draft Calls

- | | | | |
|--|--|---|---|
| o Provides opportunity to include late registrants and correct registration errors | o Late registrants and the majority of erroneous files would not be included in initial draft calls; but emergency registration may result in higher initial number of registrants | o No late registrants or erroneous files included in initial calls; but emergency registration may result in higher initial number of registrants | o Depending on lead time could be more equitable than Option B or C |
|--|--|---|---|

Compliance

- | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|
| o About 90% of total have registered - 77% of current year group. About 800,000 (10% of 8 million) are in violation of the law | o Estimates of compliance range from 70% to 95% | o Estimates of compliance range from 70% to 95%; but may be slightly lower than Option B | o Estimates of compliance range from 70% to 95% depending on warning time |
|--|---|--|---|

Acceptance

- | | | | |
|--|--|--------------------|--------------------|
| o Harris Poll: 83% support; 15% oppose | o Defense supporters in Congress would oppose; some others in Congress would favor | o Same as Option B | o Same as Option B |
|--|--|--------------------|--------------------|

Costs

- | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| o Operational Costs | o About \$4M per year of a \$20M Selective Service budget | o Congress has directed a \$12 million level; will require Administration support to avoid an unresponsive Selective Service System | o Same as Option B | o Same as Option B |
| o Peacetime Compliance Costs | o \$9.8 million for a vigorous publicity campaign | o None | o None | o None |
| | o Enforcement costs uncertain; \$0.1M with passive program; higher if active program required | o None | o None | o None |
| o Social Costs | o Amount dependent on degree of opposition to enforcement measures | o None | o None | o None |

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